The rest of South Asia sees China differently compared to India.

The problem isn't that there are differences, rather how platforms for studying China are being built across India and rest of South Asia.

A month ago, I attended the Association for Asian Studies (AAS) in Asia Conference in Kathmandu. During the event, I had conversation with Tansen Sen, Professor of History at New York University in Shanghai and someone who’d spent years studying China. As we discussed the current state of China Studies in South Asia and India, he recommended me to visit his 2013 EPW article, “Is there a need for China Studies in India?” In that article, he critiqued the prevailing approach within Indian academia, citing a lack of government interest, the prevalence of China Studies courses taught by individuals with no prior research experience on China, instructors who do not speak Mandarin, and over focus on geopolitical aspects and policymaking ignoring the other important cross-studies, thus leading to serious curricular shortcomings. Here, I quote Sen’s concluding remarks from the paper:

There is no genuine interest from the Indian Government, the private sector, or the leading think tanks in developing China studies in India at present. If the status quo is fine with them, then - at least as far as they are concerned there is indeed no need for China Studies in India. It thus maybe a waste of time for students to pursue research in a field that has no future in India, no matter how obsolete or updated the curriculum is at Indian Universities. It is useless for few outstanding Indian scholars of China to strive to do research and publish if their contribution are not recognized even within India. Resources should perhaps also not be spent on conferences and seminars that offer no new insights on China.

This made me reflect on two divergent trends in studying China. Recent geopolitical tensions with China has complicated India’s ability, willingness, and capability to engage in robust, critical, and well-informed discourse on China. On the other hand, in the rest of South Asia (hereforth I refer to it as ROSA), growing China discourse is the result of post-2008, even more visibly after the launch of BRI in 2013, relying heavily on Chinese support. As a result, there are notable differences in how China is studied in India and ROSA. These differences are not inherently undesirable as they are important for regional analysis, but here I argue that the issue is with the foundations and capacities of both India and ROSA that can have some larger impact if not addressed thoroughly.

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