Welcome to The Araniko Project’s Nepal-China in a month update for March 2026. Our monthly updates are a fantastic way to stay updated with everything about Nepal-China relations. We not only provide our additional take with major news or takes, but also through our one year plus archives of the updates, we are able to trace some of the major events across multiple timelines to provide a more clear and deeper level of engagement between the two countries.

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Politics

China congratulates RSP on the election victory
📅 11 March, 2026 | 📍 Kathmandu, Nepal

On 11th March, the International Department of the Communist Party of China sent a congratulatory message to Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) on their landslide election victory.

The letter, shared by Member of Parliament and spokesperson of RSP Manish Jha on X, states that the CPC over the years have maintained friendly exchanges with RSP and China believes that RSP will “remain committed to friendly relations with China and make new contributions to carrying forward our traditional friendship and deepening exchanges and cooperation in various fields.

Initially scheduled for a 10 day trip during September 2024, the RSP team had accepted invitation from the Communist Party of China, comprising of seven MPs and seven non-MPs under Dr. Swarnim Wagle’s leadership and included current Foreign Minister Sishir Khanal, Manish Jha, Dr. Toshima Karki and Asim Shah. That was perhaps the only time that a major RSP leadership had attended an invitation under CPC in China.

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Chinese media coverage of foreign events as observed in previous Nepal related events can be broadly categorized as follows:

• Initial reporting: Early coverage is often led by state media outlets such as Xinhua News (新华社) and China News Service (中国新闻网), whose reports are then widely republished by other Chinese media. This first round of coverage is usually short, formal, and event-driven, focusing on key facts and official developments as they emerge.

• Reporting plus analysis: Follow-up coverage by outlets such as Global Times (环球时报), Observer Net (观察者网), and The Paper (澎湃新闻) tends to be more interpretive, often incorporating commentary from Chinese academics, researchers, or other observers, as well as broader political framing. This second layer is useful for understanding how events are being contextualized for Chinese audiences beyond the initial news report. Normally, this would feature researchers, scholars and/or experts in the topic/field to write the piece or share their perspective.

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In Nepal, the March general election saw a total departure of traditional old parties to a new party - an election that is somewhat unpreceedented in Nepali history. Yet, while history was being made at home, in China the important annual Two Sessions (两会) was underway from March 4 and is expected to last for two weeks.

The Two Sessions is annual meeting of the China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) of 2765 delegates legislature, and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) - a political advisory body with about 2000 plus representatives.

The NPC delegates come from all 34 provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities, special administrative regions (SAR) and other specialized agencies within the government. Their extensive work during the two sessions includes amending the Constitution, approving the budget, and making laws. The CPPCC, on the other hand, is the political advisory body that has no legislative power, so its main function is to provide advise and submit policy proposals to the government. Its not necessary that one has to join the Party to become member of CPPCC and thus includes movie stars to even tech billionaires. It thus allows members to come up with diverse proposals and opinions that would reshape Chinese society. For e.g. during 2020’s Two Session when discussing the 14th Five-Year Plan, the 30-day “cool-off” period for divorces that was introduced in 2019 had to be revised due to its widespread criticism that it puts victims of domestic violence at greater danger. The policy had to be readjusted as it remained intact for divorces with mutual consent but would no longer be applied to those going to the court.

This event is very crucial as the government determines the economic growth target for 2026 and also the 15th five year plan from 2026-2030 which is going to inform on where Chinese government’s priorities will be for the next five years. Unlike in most of the countries around the world where GDP growth is the output or result of its yearly performance, in China GDP growth is the input as every year in Two Sessions the government determines the GDP growth target it needs to achieve for entirety of 2026. This year, the Chinese government has set the GDP target of 4.5 to 5% which is the lowest since early 1990s. From analysis to commentaries, many have expressed that lower GDP target this year means China is prioritizing security and stability over reforms. Li Qiang, China’s premier when discussing the government’s work report expressed it as:

“The uncertainty of the external environment is increasing, and the task of domestic reform and development is difficult and heavy. We must take more positive actions and more pragmatic actions to vigorously respond to various risks and challenges.”

The difficulties in domestic reform is largely attributed to reduced consumer demand. For the second consecutive year, Premier Li Qiang has stressed on boosting domestic demand and consumption as the top priority for China. Chinese per capita household savings rate was around 34% in 2025 which means that people are saving more as opposed to consuming. This is largely attributed to uncertainities in job market, fewer attractive investment options & long-term anxieties around retirement and health-care.

Another major challenge for China is to continue its export push in the midst of global uncertainities. In 2025, China saw a record trade surplus of $1.2 trillion, which helped sustain its growth as due to nature of intensified competition and price wars means that manufacturers are producing more than society is consuming, and thus it is dependent on exports to keep its economy afloat. Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao during the sessions commented on the trade surplus pledged on improving imports stating that it would increase import of agricultural products, high-end consumer goods and advanced technologies this year. It has called it as “high-level opening up” where it will aim to sign in more bilateral trades and open up fields like telecommunication, health, and education by aligning to global standards with more institutional openness.

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The 15th Five-year plan

This year’s Two Session is important as it outlines the 15th Five year plan from 2026 - 2030. Apart from improving domestic demand, important priorities are set, for the next five years, on technological breakthroughs especially in industrial robotics, artificial intelligence, and low-altitude economy. An interesting drift is that compared to its 14th Five-year plan, legislatures have ommitted Electric Vehicles (EVs) from their top priority in more than a decade. Already, there were 34 EV manufacturers in 2019 and rose to 80 in 2023 but fell to 77 in 2025 - the first decline on record. Now, without Chinese government’s major support programs, the EV industry will be heading to serious competition as price war intensifies and impact on its global sales.

The Chinese government has prioritized “technological self-reliance” as its major priority for the 15th Five-year plan. Xinhua news reports on the draft outline as “achieving greater self-reliance and strength in science and technology to develop new quality productive forces”. It plans to integrate Artificial Intelligence (AI) into its consumption upgrading. It also reports on “advancing next-generation intelligent terminals including AI-powered smartphones, computers and intelligent robots, and expand new scenarios for intelligent service consumption”. This will become an important hallmark of not just its tech-economy, but also the society in coming years.

A HongKong bases Robotics startup CEO told me a few months ago by making a prediction that “in next decade, Chinese families will be spending more money on purchasing robots than on purchasing cars” which to me signals China’s focus to prioritize its tech self-reliance.

An important area to watch out for in coming years is the low-altitude economy - a newest key priority for the 15th Five-year plan. China has championed itself on development of low-altitude economy, which generally refers to commercial use of drones within 1000 meters of airspace. With its integration, big Chinese cities will start to cash in on this market exploring its opportunities on domestic logistics and supply chain areas. Projection from Civil Aviation Administration in China suggests that by 2035, the market for low-altitude economy could surge to 3.5 trillion yuan or around 500 billion USD in today’s value.

Video taken by The Araniko Project at the Shenzhen Talent Park in Shenzhen, China in January 2026 where people can order food online and will be delivered at specific location through drones - low altitude economy.

Some key factors to keep in mind

Firstly, China’s dependence on export push has met with criticisms. In recent years, there has been research that China’s export push of ‘cheap’ products has largely affected developing country’s domestic industries due to its price advantage and mass production. India in Dec 2025 imposed 12% tariff on imports of Chinese Steel as large imports have hurt local producers. Similarly, Mexico has also raised 50% tariff on Chinese imports on cars, clothing and appliances in the face of US-China competition amidst Trump’s second term. As Nepal imports heavily and Nepali trading businesses in China are largely involved in exporting Chinese goods back home, policymakers or relevant authorities might want to promote measures to help domestic companies export to China, especially as Chinese government aims to prioritize imports.

In Nepal, 76 percent of the new EV imports are Chinese and it has seen surge and popularity in EVs in recent two years. Even though EV imports had declined by 22 percent last year, it was largely due to closure of Kerung border point for six months which was affected by glacial floods. With the new EVs no longer top priority for China’s 15th Five-year plan and government scrapping the EV subsidies, Chinese firms will engage in tough competition for its global share in EVs. For Nepal, in the short run, it can see rise in imports but as effect of subsidies wary out it will see competition with possibility of only few companies dominating the market. Globally, the effect of price war and shrinking government subsidies is being seen. For e.g. Neta Auto’s parent company filed for bankruptcy in 2025 after failing to pay wages, stranding customers in Thailand without after-sales support. But overall as stated in Rest of World, it is a win for consumers in either way.

Finally the low-altitude economy is expected to revolution in retail and distribution networks, agriculture modernization, disaster management and aerial tourism in the long run. Already, China’s top companies like Aerospace Times Feipeng is exploring overseas market and in coming years the trend is expected to follow. Nepal’s policies towards drones at present only limits around 500 meters and as per the World Bank faces an outdated regulatory framework, lack of structured training on its management for professionals and limited support for micro SMEs to grow and scale their innovation. An opportunity can be to explore the potential of low-altitude economy while as China’s economic engagement increases with Nepal, companies can also look forward to bringing innovation through commercial use of drones in the future. All of which requires Nepal to re-examine its policies on commercial use of drones in near future.

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Deep insights on China & Nepal that is grounded in using primary sources, archives, interviews and original commentaries. The newsletter is hosted by Raunab & Aneka - two scholars with more than ten years of experience in China.

Welcome to The Araniko Project’s Nepal–China in a Month update, where readers can stay informed about all major developments shaping Nepal–China relations. Join us beyond the paywall to not only keep up with the latest activities, but also to track progress of major activities across our one year of carefully built monthly archives.

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Politics

Chinese Ambassador Zhang Maoming presents his credentials to the President of Nepal Ram Chandra Poudel
📅 26 February, 2026 | 📍 Kathmandu, Nepal

The new Chinese Ambassador Zhang Maoming has presented his letter of credentials to President of Nepal Ram Chandra Poudel on February 26, 2026.

After his credentials, Kantipur has reported that Chinese government is set to provide $4 million as grant aid for Nepal for the upcoming elections. The Cabinet meeting held has decided to accept the amount received as grant.

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Until about a decade ago, it was possible for a foreign entrepreneur with limited China experience to succeed in the Chinese market. In Guangzhou, I spoke with a Nepali entrepreneur who arrived in the late 2000s to start a business and operated for nearly two years before formally registering his company. Many entrepreneurs I talked to from that period recall that local governments, themselves, were still experimenting with regulatory practices to support private enterprise. For early entrants, this created an optimum window of opportunity where institutional bottlenecks were relatively light, and those who adapted quickly could succeed with the system as it matured.

Trying to follow that similar path in today’s China, however, would be almost impossible.

When I travelled to Yiwu, Zhejiang Province in 2024, the city also known as the ‘World’s Small Business Capital’, I was reminded of how much the landscape has changed. About three decades ago, many Nepali traders came to Yiwu as sourcing agents or representatives of trading companies, helping overseas buyers connect with Chinese manufacturers. Back then language was a decisive asset i.e. anyone with a conversational Chinese language skills could move up quickly, coordinating logistics and managing cross-border communication at scale. However, in Yiwu today and across much of China, language skills alone are no longer enough. In fact, Chinese suppliers & entrepreneurs themselves are fully capable of navigating social media platforms like TikTok, Facebook or Whatsapp to communicate directly with international buyers. The traditional intermediary role of agent has therefore become competitive, if not partially redundant.

What this shift reveals is that the old strategies of working in China no longer holds. Success in today’s China requires more than just opportunistic entry or linguistic ability. It demands a deep understanding of fast-moving consumer preferences, evolving government policies, and increasingly sophisticated business and technological ecosystem. These are insights that are not acquired easily unlike a decade ago. Success in today’s China is best done by people who are already embedded into the society. This is because long-term residents - whether through studying in China, have generational family business or have pre-existing networks are better able to grasp regulatory and socio-cultural changes better than those without such experience. For Nepali companies, engagement with China requires a well-articulated China strategy.

In this article, I will outline on why such a strategy is more necessary today than ever before.

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Welcome to The Araniko Project’s first Nepal China in a month update for 2026. Against a backdrop of intensifying domestic politics in Nepal ahead of elections, January has seen some important updates in Nepal - China relations: from ousting Huawei to proposal for Lhasa-Kathmandu bus route, to central bank governor’s discussion in Tianjin, and exploring new investment opportunities and sister cities collaboration. All this and much more in detail in our January 2026 updates.

What makes our monthly update unique is not only recording of the events, but the ability to situate them within an ongoing timeline. Developments in January, whether its in telecom, trade, or exchanges, echoes debates and decisions from previous months, thus allows our readers to see continuities, reversals and patterns. The updates are more than just ‘news’.

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On December 18, China’s Ambassador Chen Song paid a farewell visit to Prime Minister Sushila Karki as he returns back to Beijing. During his visit, his comment on requesting the PM Karki that Chinese entities not be implicated in the Pokhara International Airport (PIA) corruption allegations caused quite a discussion across Nepali social media users. The statement came as a result of the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse and Authority (CIAA) filing a record case at the Supreme Court against alleged corruption in PIA involving 55 individuals including five former ministers, two dozen bureaucrats and two Chinese officials from China CAMC Engineering.

The series of events leading up to the construction and aftermath geopolitics of PIA is a case of over-reliance on informal network ties as means to achieve desired outcomes as opposed to using formal rule-based mechanisms. Since 2016, China has come a long way on its dealings with developing and under-developed countries on handling infrastructure projects. While it has made significant progress in reforming how it engages with developing countries on larger infrastructure projects, a lesson from PIA case is the need for stronger oversight, due diligence, reliance on more formal channels and ensuring accountability mechanism especially for large Chinese State Owned Companies.

It also points to systemic weaknesses on both sides. Chinese companies and institutions bear responsibility for insufficient due diligence, weak risk assessment, and an overreliance on informal channels when operating in fragile institutional environments. At the same time, as the host country, Nepal exercised the greatest agency throughout such informal negotiations, corrupt politicians and their malpractices and seeking approvals without any formal rule of law, and therefore carried primary responsibility for weak oversight and regulatory enforcement. This piece uses the PIA case to move beyond the immediate controversy and examine the nature of negotiation itself, how decisions are optimized, responsibility is understood, and why outcomes are often defended very differently once projects are completed.

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This post was originally scheduled for the first week of September. However, given the turbulent political climate in Nepal following the protests on September 8 and 9, we decided to reschedule it in order to better address the growing number of messages we’ve received on our social media platforms about studying in China. This article is particularly targeted toward aspiring undergraduate students, though many of the points discussed will be relevant to anyone considering studying in China in the future.

Note: Keeping in mind the huge number of Nepali students studying medicine in China, some FAQs have been answered by a Nepali student, who completed undergrad in medicine from Peking University and is currently pursuing a masters degree in medical field in Fudan University.

Education background

Last month marks ten years since I first set off for China to begin my undergraduate studies at Peking University. The journey was anything but smooth. My admission into China’s top university came with a condition: I had to pass HSK 6, HSKK Advanced, and an entrance exam within one to two years.

I began with a Pre-University Program at Beijing Language and Culture University (2015–2016), a specialized Chinese language track for high school graduates. I then chose to continue with another year of the program at Peking University (2016–2017). Those two years were some of the most intense of my life, a period that would either make me or break me.

Within a year and four months, I cleared HSK 6 and HSKK Advanced, and eventually passed the entrance exam. I enrolled in the School of Government at Peking University, becoming the first Nepali to complete an undergraduate degree at not only School of Government, but also in Peking University in social science discipline. I graduated online in 2021, right in the middle of the pandemic. Three years later, as China and the world began to recover and open up post-pandemic, I returned to Peking University for my master’s in China Studies at the Yenching Academy, focusing on international relations and politics.

This is just the surface of what has been a transformative experience. Over the years, many Nepali and international students have reached out to me for advice on applying to Chinese universities and navigating life as a student there. To make things easier, I’ve put together answers to some of the most common questions I get. Hopefully, this can serve as a useful reference for anyone considering studying in China.

1. Why did you choose to study in China?

China was not part of my higher education plans until my father mentioned it. Like most of my classmates, I was preparing to apply to universities in the US during my final year of high school. My father had been traveling to China for work for more than a decade and had seen the scale of change with his own eyes. He was convinced that China represented the future, and he encouraged me to think differently.

For me, two things were certain. First, the idea of giving up my Nepali citizenship or permanently settling abroad never appealed to me. I always knew I would return home. Second, I did not want to place a financial burden on my parents. Studying in China, with scholarships available, addressed both concerns while also keeping me closer to Nepal.

My father also reminded me that adding Mandarin to my existing languages of English, Hindi, and Nepali would give me the ability to connect with a large part of the world’s population. In the end, it was a combination of proximity, affordability, and the opportunity to learn a new language that made China the right choice for me.

2. I’m interested to study in China, but how to I start?

I understand that applying to Chinese universities seem daunting but before reaching out with this question, I would suggest to do a preliminary search on the internet and focus on three things 1) Why do you want to study in China ? 2) Which subject/field you’re interested in pursuing your degree ? 3) Which Chinese universities have you looked into and shortlisted? (If information is not sufficient, email or directly call the university’s respective department or International Students Office).

Prospective students can also search for degree programs through web portals like China Admissions in order to find the right university and program or can browse through their preferred universities and their program list.

This basic effort is important because then one will be able to ask more focused questions which will give you a direction instead of leading you down more rabbit holes.

3. How do you apply to Chinese universities and scholarship?

Before I answer, I should mention that over the past ten years the systems and platforms for applying have likely been updated. I have not kept up with every change, and my memory of the details is not perfect. What I do remember is that I applied through the official website at the time, where I had to list my top three universities along with transcripts, a study plan, and personal information.

Soon after, I received a call from the Chinese Embassy. At first I thought it was good news, but in reality they were calling to discourage me from applying to China’s top three universities, which I had listed as Peking University(PKU), Tsinghua University, and Fudan University. They told me that some Nepali and other foreign students had struggled and dropped out in the past, which made the embassy hesitant to endorse my application. I was not willing to compromise. Eventually we reached an agreement: if I applied directly through the university portal and received an offer, they would offer me with the Chinese Government Scholarship(CGS). I did receive an offer from PKU, conditional on first completing Mandarin training, and the scholarship followed. This is still the case, you first get accepted and then apply for scholarships especially CGS which is usually granted for those accepted to top universities.

That was my personal case. In general, there are several types of scholarships available, including the CGS, provincial or city-level scholarships, and the Confucius Institute scholarship. My advice is to apply directly through the official university websites and follow their instructions. Avoid consultancies, as they often charge unnecessary fees. Application fees are usually around 800 RMB (about 15,000 NPR), and this should be clearly stated on the university website.

Do not hesitate to contact the university directly. Email inquiries are normally answered within three to five working days, and phone calls to the International Students’ Office are usually attended during office hours. Having worked in the International Students’ Office at Peking University myself, I can vouch that reaching out directly is the most reliable option.

Finally, keep track of both university and scholarship deadlines. In most cases, scholarship applications open only after one have received an admission offer from the university. Make sure to check your university’s timeline and confirm details well in advance by emailing the relevant office.

Medical studies: To apply to Chinese universities as a medical student, especially from Nepal, start by choosing a 6-year program, as most undergraduate medical programs in for Nepali students studying abroad has to be six years long (including internship) and this excludes Chinese language foundation. Universities like Fudan University offer NMC-approved 6-year English MBBS programs (scholarship is tough to attain), which are more accessible for international students, while Peking University only offers the program in Chinese, requiring a high HSK level and extra preparation time (research yourself for other univerities). Always confirm that the university and program are approved by the Nepal Medical Council (NMC) to ensure your degree will allow you to take the licensing exam and practice in Nepal. Be aware that applying without meeting NMC criteria — such as clearing the Common Entrance Examination — is risky and could affect your future medical career in Nepal.

When it comes to scholarships, the Chinese Government Scholarship (CSC) is a popular option that covers tuition, accommodation, and sometimes a stipend, but it is highly competitive and does not replace NMC requirements. Apply directly through the Chinese Embassy or Consulate in Nepal, or via the university’s international office, and carefully follow both Chinese university application guidelines and Nepal’s medical education regulations. Do your own research, don’t rely solely on others’ advice, and apply at your own risk if you haven’t met the necessary criteria — including NMC registration and entrance exams. Choose your university wisely, ideally one with a 6-year program, and remember that the responsibility for following the rules and understanding the process lies entirely with you.

For graduate programs (Master’s- 3 years program), the process is similar: you apply directly to the university or through the Chinese Government Scholarship (CSC), but most top universities in China only offer Chinese-taught programs at the graduate level in research-based academic fields, not professional or clinical degrees (for clinical degrees -Southern Medical, Tongji, Dali, Dalian University are few of them). Like undergraduates, graduate students must also follow Nepal’s education regulations, including any required entrance or licensing exams. Apply at your own risk if you haven’t met the criteria set by Nepali authorities, and don’t rely solely on others for guidance. Whether undergraduate or graduate, do your own research, choose recognized programs.

4. How difficult is studying Chinese language?

This is my favorite question. Mandarin is a tough language to master. The reason I say master is because if you’re pursing a Chinese-taught degree then you will need to master it to some extent. However, simply answering this question, it completely depends on your own motivation and purpose of learning the language. For me, I love learning languages and I improvise on many techniques and methods to learn the language even today. It’s a never ending journey. One thing many people don’t realize before starting Chinese language is that every Chinese character demands your attention and has to be memorized in stroke order. It’s absolutely not a language you can study part time to reach a commendable proficiency. Hence, Chinese language doesn’t have to be difficult but it’s not easy. If you’ve set your mind of learning the language then prepare to give it the time it requires and find your own way or aspect to love the language after you (might) hate it for the tough time it’ll give you.

Everyone has their own way of studying Chinese that works for them, I’d encourage you to find yours.

(If there is demand, I might do a separate piece about my methods and understanding)

By medical student: Studying Chinese is a never-ending journey — one that’s as challenging as it is rewarding, and its difficulty depends heavily on your motivation, goals, and support system. I started learning in Shandong, continued through my undergraduate years in Beijing, and am now at Fudan University. For daily life and general communication, Chinese is absolutely manageable and opens up a richer experience of living in China. But in demanding fields like medicine, where you’re relearning complex academic content in a second language, the challenge intensifies. It can feel overwhelming at first — you might struggle to keep up, feel extra pressure, or get frustrated from having to relearn everything in Chinese. But pushing through that discomfort is part of the process, and every bit of effort counts toward your growth and future.

The key is to stay motivated and not do it alone. Whether your goal is academic, professional, or personal, having a like-minded community — friends or a study group willing to practice and make mistakes together — makes the journey much easier. I learned this lesson late, but forming a support network helps you stay consistent and pushes you out of your comfort zone in the best way. Learning Chinese isn’t just about mastering the language; it’s about what that mastery enables: deeper connections, better opportunities, and a more fulfilling life in China. Keep learning, keep relearning, and most importantly, keep going.

5. Would you recommend pursing a Chinese-taught degree?

Chinese language may not be everyone’s cup of tea but with that again one won’t know until you try. If you’re able and willing to patiently give time to study Chinese language, then I would recommend a Chinese-taught degree for better experience especially in terms of lectures. The experience of attending lectures, engaging with professors, and interacting with classmates in Chinese provides a depth of learning that goes far beyond what you can achieve in an English-taught program. It is also the only way to push your proficiency well beyond the level of HSK 6. While many programs require HSK 6 or HSKK Advanced as an entry condition, these tests are only the starting point. Once you are actually enrolled in a Chinese-taught program, you will quickly realize that much higher proficiency is needed to keep up with coursework and academic discussions.

My personal tip is to stay curious and make it a habit to learn new words in your field of study every day. Over time, that consistency will build the kind of fluency you need not just to survive, but to thrive in a Chinese academic environment.

6. How cheap/expensive is studying/living in China?

Tuition fees vary by program and university, so the best way to get exact figures is to check the official websites of the universities you are interested in. In my case, I was on the Chinese Government Scholarship, which covered everything: tuition, accommodation, a flight to China at the start of my studies and a return ticket after graduation, plus a monthly stipend (2,500 RMB for undergraduates, 3,000 RMB for master’s students, and 3,500 RMB for PhD students).

Living expenses depend a lot on the city. Beijing and Shanghai are naturally more expensive than smaller cities. Eating outside the campus usually costs between 30 and 50 RMB per meal, though cheaper options are available at local shops and street food stands. On campus, dining halls are heavily subsidized, so you can get a proper meal for 15 to 20 RMB.

Accommodation costs also vary by university and location. Dorms tend to be much cheaper than renting an apartment off-campus. Daily necessities and shopping are made affordable and convenient through platforms like Taobao, JD, and Meituan.

In short, with a scholarship or careful budgeting, living in China is manageable, though costs in big cities will always be higher than others.

7. What is something you wish you knew before coming to China?

As the first Nepali to graduate from Peking University’s undergraduate program (main campus, not the medical campus), I often wished I had a senior to guide me through this exact question. Looking back, I think an orientation session by the Chinese Embassy or even advice from Nepali alumni of Chinese universities would have been incredibly valuable.

Practical guidance on studying and living in China would have saved me a lot of trial and error. Things like tips for learning Chinese more effectively, understanding how to make the most of campus life, or simply knowing the basics of everyday life in China would have helped me feel more prepared. For example, I had no idea how digitalized payments were, which apps would be essential, or what cultural etiquette to be mindful of. Even a simple list of do’s and don’ts would have gone a long way.

8. Any tips on applying to Chinese universities?

• Do your own research on Chinese universities. Check their ranking in the world, China and your subject-wise. Then check their official website and for any missing information on application and scholarship, email or call them for inquiries instead of running to consultancies.

• Only apply to the top or well reputed universities of China. Regardless of if you’re pursing a Chinese-taught degree or an English-taught degree, always opt for the top universities in China with a good reputation as their facility and infrastructure will also be better. These universities have experience with international students and will have proper provisions. There are some Chinese universities that look to fill the international students quota offering scholarships but often don’t intend to provide decent university experience including opportunities. However, if you’re not looking for much and just want a scholarship in any Chinese university then this guide might not even be for you.

• Start studying Mandarin: it’s never too late to start learning Mandarin. Even if you’re pursuing an English-taught degree, you will still be taking a 4 credit Chinese language course for two semesters. When you reach China, you’ll soon realize how essential it is to learn the language. While learning the language in China will be better, it’s not a bad idea to start learning in Nepal to give you some foundation or an idea of how the language works.

• Read about China: regardless of your major, start from history and you can venture into your own field in China’s context. This will help you understand some part of how and why things work the way it does in China for a starter. If you get curious enough about Nepal-China relations then subscribe to The Araniko Project!

A full access to The Araniko Project provides a nuanced perspective on China’s overall influence in Nepal. Through the lens of history, art, society, politics, and economics, we explore how a global superpower influences Nepal, and how Nepal engages with China. As the only newsletter and institution in Nepal continuously dedicated to advancing the study of China, we are powered by the support of our readers and well-wishers. Therefore, consider going paid: Your subscription not only sustains our ability to produce original contents, but also helps us push forward national conversations on Nepal-China relations. You can click on subscribe button below or from our About us section for Nepali payments.

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Welcome to The Araniko Project’s Nepal China in a Month series for September 2025. This month’s update ranges from news about China’s congratulations to Nepal’s interim government after Gen-Z protests, to border trade collapsing under flood damage, to renewed sister city ties, culture promotion and Huawei’s corporate lobbying for Nepal’s network infrastructure.

This month was a significant month given the Gen-Z uprising in Sep 8-9 that led to not only destruction of property and regime overthrow, but also more than 74 lives lost. We hope the families of lost ones find courage in these difficult times and hope that such scenarios can never happen again.

Politics

China congratulated Nepal’s new interim government

📅 September 18, 2025 | 📍 Kathmandu, Nepal

• Chinese Ambassador Chen Song congratulated PM Karki on his appointment, emphasizing the 70th anniversary of China–Nepal ties and China’s support for Nepal’s sovereignty, stability, and development. He called for deeper cooperation and protection of Chinese interests in Nepal. PM Karki reaffirmed Nepal’s commitment to the One-China Principle, pledged to prevent anti-China activities on Nepali soil, and expressed hope to strengthen bilateral ties and advance national development with continued Chinese support.

• The new interim government came after the Gen-Z protest from September 8-9 that led to overthrow of KP Oli’s government. Right before the protest, KP Oli and his delegation had attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit and attended the Chinese memorial for war of resistance against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War from August 31 - September 03, 2025.

• The following image1 is a timeline of China’s official reaction and interaction with Nepal after the Sept 8 protest. The gap between events and response has drawn some attention, and understandably so. Many noticed the delay in response and congratulations, which is valid, but we argue that they were still observing the situation and waiting for a more stable window to send wishes. This delay doesn’t have to be over-analyzed beyond maybe feeling the pressure to immediately after a surprise wish from the exiled Dalai Lama, which came after Modi’s wishes.

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During the week of Nepal’s Gen-Z protest movement, much of the immediate coverage and commentary circulated on platforms such as X, Instagram, and TikTok, which became the primary sources of real-time information. Although Chinese media had already begun covering the protests, this coverage became more relevant to analysis after September 10, when the appointment of Sushila Karki as interim Prime Minister provided a political focal point for subsequent reporting and commentary. Within the firewall, reporting was marked by selective framing, while online discussions revealed widespread misinformation, but also some positive and nuanced reporting. If you want to read more on our take on Nepali Gen-Z protest, read our earlier article here.

Over the past few days, I’ve also received number of messages requesting insights into Chinese media coverage of Nepal. Here’s what I’ve seen so far, along with my observations. Consider becoming a paid subscriber to read the full article. You can upgrade to paid by clicking link below or can click here.

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As expected, the Chinese government formally addressed Nepal’s political unrest on the afternoon of September 10 through a Ministry of Foreign Affairs press conference. A congratulatory message to the newly appointed Prime Minister, Sushila Karki, followed on September 14. The gap between events and response has drawn some attention, and understandably so. Many noticed the delay in response and congratulations, which is valid, but I’d argue that they were still observing the situation and waiting for a more stable window to send wishes. This delay doesn’t have to be over-analyzed beyond maybe feeling the pressure to immediately after a surprise wish from the exiled Dalai Lama, which came after Modi’s wishes.

Chinese state media, including Xinhua, had begun reporting on September 9 by 5pm. The coverage was measured, acknowledging the protests in surface while omitting detailed references to their causes. What appears is a cautious framing, focused more on recording events than interpreting them.

When I searched for “尼泊尔” (Nepal) on Weibo, the platform suggested a cluster of related terms that have often been used alongside it. A few stood out.

“局势” (júshì) translates as “situation” or “state of affairs,” most often in a political register, while “暴乱” (bàoluàn) conveys “violent riot.” The latter frequently appeared with near-synonyms such as “动乱” (dòngluàn) and “暴动” (bàodòng), each carrying connotations of disorder and unrest. Another striking entry was “夫人” (fūrén). In everyday usage it simply means “wife,” yet in political language it refers specifically to the spouse of a male leader. Here, it was tied to a widely circulated but false story about the wife of former Prime Minister Jhala Nath Khanal, with several posts prematurely reporting her death in an alleged attack. The term “财政部长” (cáizhèng bùzhǎng), or “finance minister,” was also prominent. It pointed toward a video purportedly showing Bishnu Poudel being chased and kicked, although the footage remains unverified, as the individual’s face was never clearly visible.

An honorable mention is “手工本” (shǒugōngběn), which stands out as an odd one in this list. It refers to handmade notebooks made from lokta paper, popular among Chinese tourists and on social media. Somehow, it continues to rank prominently in Weibo discussions about Nepal.

Images of protests from the first day and scenes of burning buildings from the second had already circulated widely on Chinese social media by the time the events unfolded. Many Weibo and WeChat commentators quickly adopted the narrative that a supposed social media ban had triggered the unrest. This framing is undoubtedly borrowed from foreign outlets, particularly Indian media and Western platforms like the BBC, which shamelessly blamed social media at the outset.

Weibo, in particular, has since been inundated with both factual updates and speculative content related to Nepal’s crisis. Hashtags like #尼泊尔将由谁来接管 (“Who Will Lead Nepal”) and #尼泊尔多地爆发大规模示威游行 (“Large-Scale Protests Break Out Across Nepal”) gained traction. The following example illustrates just one of many posts that attracted significant engagement.

Unsurprisingly, a number of articles and posts also speculated about a “color revolution,” as well as attributing the unrest to alleged foreign interference, most often linked to the United States and India.

One example is (reference picture below) Song Zhongping (宋忠平), a commentator with over 1.05 million followers. In his post, he interprets Nepal’s protests and their aftermath by citing what he presents as headlines from Nepali, Indian, and British media. Yet these references are merely translated snippets, offered without sources or substantive content. He ultimately concludes that India is orchestrating the unrest with the aim of exercising complete control over Nepal and preventing it from pursuing independent relations with other countries.

Some of the more extreme examples of misinformation even claimed that China had dispatched the People’s Liberation Army to Nepal under a state of emergency. For once and for this context, I wish such fabricated posts had been censored so as to not spread blatant misinformation.

While some commentary identified corruption and inequality as the underlying drivers of Nepal’s unrest, considerable confusion persists about what is actually unfolding. Many articles single out one element of the movement and inflate it into the defining narrative. A striking example is an article titled “Nepal’s New PM, Elected by AI,” which has already drawn more than 49,000 views, 1,400 likes, and 600 shares. The piece highlights the role of Discord as a platform for political discussion and claims, with evident irony, that meeting participants relied on the American AI tool ChatGPT to choose a prime minister. The author concludes, mockingly, that the United States manipulated Nepal’s leadership decision through ChatGPT.

The comment section amplified the satire, with some readers suggesting Nepal should diversify its options by consulting DeepSeek as well, while others dismissed the scenario as something lifted directly from a science fiction novel.

While some sensational pieces are designed purely to attract attention, there are also more substantive attempts at explanation and analysis, even if many stop short of deeper engagement such as conducting interviews. One example is the article “Nepal’s Situation is an Inevitable Product of ‘Institutional Mismatch’” by Liang Danmei, a Ph.D. candidate at the School of International Relations, Sichuan University. Originally published on another WeChat account and later reshared by South Asian Studies Newsletter (南亚研究通讯), a widely followed subscription page focusing on South Asian politics and economics, the piece adopts a more analytical approach.

Liang frames Nepal’s turmoil through political, social, and economic lenses, identifying corruption and the demand for development as central drivers of the unrest. Liang concludes with a stark warning: “This protest will not be the last if Nepali political elites fail to wake up to the lessons of blood and fire and continue to ignore these deep-seated issues.”

Like how foreigners all over the world suddenly started dropping their two cents on Nepal and foreign newsrooms with newborn Nepal experts, China is no exception. There are many hard-watch videos of Chinese commentators trying to explain Nepal’s political change but often make the same mistakes like simplifying complex dynamics, overlooking context, or relying on secondhand narratives.

Among the few substantial commentaries on Nepal in Chinese media, Liang Wendao’s analysis on the Eight and a Half(八分半) podcast stands out. Speaking slowly and with clarity, he guides his listeners through Nepal’s political and historical context, directly and indirectly addressing many of the misconceptions circulating online. He opens by dismissing the widespread claim that a social media ban toppled the government, warning that such arguments overlook Nepal’s historical, political, and social realities. As he put it, “这些分析忽略了很具体的国家状况，抽离了那些情况单独来讲，就非常不靠谱” (“These analyses ignore very specific national circumstances. If you strip those situations out and discuss them in isolation, it becomes highly unreliable”).

Liang even ventures into the complex subject of Nepal’s numerous communist and socialist parties of Nepal sliding some chuckles at the expected confusion for any Chinese listener but also very much clarified that the communist parties of Nepal cannot be compared to the communist party in China due to different context and background. He goes on to describe the movement as a textbook revolution: not organized by a single leader or group, but arising organically through social media platforms where citizens united around shared sentiments of peace and change, though it eventually escalated into violence.

I ended my observation on a different note, with Xiaohongshu (小红书, Rednote), a lifestyle and tourism app more commonly associated with travel recommendations than political debate. Searching “Nepal” there led me to a post from September 14 asking whether it was safe to visit during China’s Golden Week holiday in early October. The advice given was pragmatic: wait and observe the situation. As one comment put it, “Nepal has always been a country to be experienced slowly, and right now it is even better to visit once the turbulence has passed.” A lively comment chain followed, with users noting that conditions had since normalized and others sharing upcoming travel plans while seeking recommendations.

For Nepal, and particularly the Nepal Tourism Board, this moment could present an opportunity. If the country wishes to reassure potential Chinese visitors, engaging Chinese travel influencers to provide timely guidance on how and where to travel safely might be one of the most effective steps.

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This post is different from our usual focus at The Araniko Project. But as Nepali co-founders watching the chaos unfold from Beijing, it is difficult to remain silent and feel the need to share some reflections on the aftermath of the past two days of protest.

This post is only about Nepal. If you want to know what happened in the past 48 hrs, please read Kalam Weekly

Kalam Weekly

The KP Oli government has murdered 19 people

This is a special newsletter necessitated by unprecedented events…

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8 months ago · 74 likes · 8 comments · Pranaya Rana

What we witnessed in these past two days in Nepal is a war of two worlds. On one side stand the old regimes and their old netas, with their outdated mindset of conducting daily public affairs. Until just 48 hours ago, they were the invincibles. Now, Nepal’s ruling elites stand among the fallen: disgraced and deposed, fleeing for their lives with almost no path back to the political stage.

On the other side lies the outlook for a “new Nepal,” which has not yet even been born. There is still no certainty (as of this writing) as to who will lead the interim government. And while the protestors relish on the carnage of 9/9, is there any guarantee this will turn out better?

Mercilessly beating politicians nearly to death, burning a former Prime Minister’s wife, vandalizing the streets, and destroying public property: these are no longer Gen Z protests. These are hooligans, who in their desperation and anger failed to see the evil in themselves. If its the outlook for “new Nepal,” then what is the difference between the upcoming “new” and the already “old”? We can only hope we don’t end up with the worst of both worlds.

In the digital age, network power such as social media has challenged traditional state authority, as seen in the Gen Z protest that led to the resignation of Prime Minister K.P. Oli. But such network power can only challenge and overthrow; it cannot successfully govern a country. It also needs a stable structure and well functioning bureaucracy.

That is where the greatest challenge lies. The protestors have burned down Singha Durbar (the country’s administrative center and repository of key government records), the Supreme Court, educational institutions, Nepal Telecom, banks, hotels, large corporations, and even media institutions like Kanitpur: essentially every major structural institution shaping Nepal’s functioning has collapsed. Thousands of papers, documentations, gone in seconds! prisoners escaped from prison!

How can new Nepal function without the necessary preconditional infrastructures needed for well-functioning bureaucracy? I am not the first person to state just how exhausting, and dissapointing Nepal’s bureaucracy is. But, the jist is that without proper functioning of institutions, people will again quickly loose trust, and just like the aftermath of Jana Andolan II, regimes will come and get replaced by their duplicates, and suddenly everything feels the same as before repeating this endless cycle of protests

Another instance is when I see the protestors burning precious heritage such as Bhaktapur Durbar Square. I remember attending a lecture in 2022 by the eminent Wolfgang Korn, an architect who “illegally” drew maps of Kathmandu, Bhaktapur, and Patan Durbar Squares while serving in the Peace Corps during the mid-1960s. Little did he know that when the earthquake struck decades later, it turned out the Kathmandu municipality did not even have maps for reconstructing the temples, and Korn’s drawings were the only maps in the entire world that could help builders restore the temples to their exact form. Such is the state of our institutions - we did not even have a single homegrown record of our temples. How on earth can we think about a better future when we are not capable enough to understand, respect, and not destroy our own institutions? Even if born out of desperation, burning temples, Singha Durbar, and the courts is an absolute disregard for our national heritage, a lack of belonging, and the byproduct of the state’s negligence throughout all these years.

In that sense, my hope is that whoever leads the government from now on will not focus too much on preserving their grip on power, as the old regimes did, but also rebuild public trust and institutions that endure beyond a single crisis. Its ironic that the top leaders of UML, Nepali Congress and Maoists are at the receiving end against the very thing they were protesting in Jana Andolan II. Maybe from now on it will be a government led by young and dynamic forces, but if we start destroying the structures and the very fabric that makes us “us”, then it risks of becoming just another failed revolution. The great reset is needed, not just on our politics, bureaucracy and institutions, but also on Nepali society in general.

Photo credits: onlinekhabar.com

Since returning to Nepal in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, I have closely followed how Chinese media covers Nepal. From reporting on Chinese netizens’ reactions to regime changes in Nepal, to the MCC, and most recently the 2024 visit of Prime Minister KP Oli to China, some clear patterns stand out in the coverage process in Chinese media. I will elaborate on these patterns further in this article in light to recent PM KP Oli’s visit to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit.

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Welcome to The Araniko Project’s Nepal–China in a Month series for August 2025. This month’s updates range from resurfaced Lipulekh tensions and Prime Minister Oli’s visit to China, to the Kasthamandap Dialogue on the MCC and the announcement of the next Everest Friendship military drill. We also track progress on the Nepal Pavilion in Yushu, highlight growing cooperation in health and disaster research, and round things off with our Neighborhood Watch on India–China dynamics at the SCO summit.

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If we compare the year 1912 and 2025, the contrast between political governance of Nepal and China feels almost like an inversion: China was experimenting with a fragile republic system (hereafter will use Republic of China ROC) after the collapse of Qing dynasty in 1911, while at that time Nepal had remained firm under autocratic Rana rule; today, Nepal is ‘still experimenting’ with the republic after collapse of monarchy in 2008, while China thrives under a centralized One-party state rule becoming a major power.

After the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911, the revolutionary Sun Yat-sen, a trained medical doctor from Hong Kong who had spent his years in Japan and Western countries, became the first provisional President of China in 1912. His presidency was short-lived, lasting only 45 days, before Yuan Shikai, the Qing dynasty’s top military leader, asserted his power and became the first official President of China. This marked the beginning of a period of political crisis in the country.

Nepal, on the other hand, experienced one of its longest periods of political stability under Chandra Sumsher Rana, who became Prime Minister in 1901 and served for 28 years until 1929: the longest tenure of any Rana Prime Minister. One of the significant achievements in his reign is considered to be the 1923 Treaty between Nepal and Great Britain, in which Britain formally recognized Nepal’s sovereignty. Popular discourse holds that this treaty cemented Nepal’s status in the international arena. However, as noted by Pratyoush Onta, a historian and currently affiliated with Martin Chautari, in The Kathmandu Post, such claims have been questioned. Diplomats such as Rishikesh Shah, have argued that while the treaty’s text acknowledged Nepal’s independent status, in practice, Nepal’s diplomacy continued to be conducted through Delhi.

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A month ago, I attended the Association for Asian Studies (AAS) in Asia Conference in Kathmandu. During the event, I had conversation with Tansen Sen, Professor of History at New York University in Shanghai and someone who’d spent years studying China. As we discussed the current state of China Studies in South Asia and India, he recommended me to visit his 2013 EPW article, “Is there a need for China Studies in India?” In that article, he critiqued the prevailing approach within Indian academia, citing a lack of government interest, the prevalence of China Studies courses taught by individuals with no prior research experience on China, instructors who do not speak Mandarin, and over focus on geopolitical aspects and policymaking ignoring the other important cross-studies, thus leading to serious curricular shortcomings. Here, I quote Sen’s concluding remarks from the paper:

There is no genuine interest from the Indian Government, the private sector, or the leading think tanks in developing China studies in India at present. If the status quo is fine with them, then - at least as far as they are concerned there is indeed no need for China Studies in India. It thus maybe a waste of time for students to pursue research in a field that has no future in India, no matter how obsolete or updated the curriculum is at Indian Universities. It is useless for few outstanding Indian scholars of China to strive to do research and publish if their contribution are not recognized even within India. Resources should perhaps also not be spent on conferences and seminars that offer no new insights on China.

This made me reflect on two divergent trends in studying China. Recent geopolitical tensions with China has complicated India’s ability, willingness, and capability to engage in robust, critical, and well-informed discourse on China. On the other hand, in the rest of South Asia (hereforth I refer to it as ROSA), growing China discourse is the result of post-2008, even more visibly after the launch of BRI in 2013, relying heavily on Chinese support. As a result, there are notable differences in how China is studied in India and ROSA. These differences are not inherently undesirable as they are important for regional analysis, but here I argue that the issue is with the foundations and capacities of both India and ROSA that can have some larger impact if not addressed thoroughly.

A full access to The Araniko Project provides a nuanced perspective on China’s overall influence in Nepal and beyond. Through the lens of history, art, society, politics, and economics, we explore how a global superpower influences Nepal, and how Nepal engages with China. As the only newsletter and institution in Nepal continuously dedicated to advancing the study of China, we are powered by the support of our readers and well-wishers. Therefore, consider going paid: Your subscription not only sustains our ability to produce original contents, but also helps us push forward national conversations on Nepal-China relations.

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Content

Politics

1. Chinese Tibetology delegation, organized by the State Council, engaged in academic and cultural dialogue in Kathmandu.

2. Sister city collaboration between Dhulikhel Municipality and Ali prefecture in Lhasa.

3. Nepali Congress delegation visits Zhongshan to deepen Party and Economic Cooperation.

Economics

1. Guangzhou Pharmaceutical Group leads a delegation in Nepal to sign MoU

2. 9th China-South Asia Expo held in Kunming

Society

1. First “China Xizang Connections Cultural Week” held in Kathmandu

2. First Regional Public Welfare Cooperation Symposium held in Kathmandu

3. Chinese Embassy launched “Swachha Pani Abhiyan” in Madhesh Province.

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From the 1950s, before reform and opening up in 1978, China’s economic and administrative system was a highly centralized planning system. Yet cities like Shanghai continued to play the role of sub-national actors under China’s centralized foreign aid system, and the city was responsible for providing key technical support on Nepal’s infrastructure projects. This article will highlight city-level implementation aligned with China’s national political objectives, while also Nepal benefiting from Shanghai’s industrial and human capital advantages.

Why Shanghai? In much of the 19th century, Shanghai was the hub for Western powers and was an attractive place for foreign investments, thus enjoying high levels of human capital and technical development. Thus, it comes as no surprise that Shanghai was appointed as the national implementor of the Chinese government’s foreign assistance program due to its comprehensive industrial base, global experience, and political reliability.

As China’s leading industrial and economic hub, Shanghai assumed the role of an "implementor" of central government foreign aid, deploying its resources, expertise, and institutional capacity to deliver multi-faceted assistance to Nepal. This included the construction of complete industrial projects, the provision of equipment, the training of Nepali professionals, and the dispatch of technical experts. Shanghai's contributions significantly influenced Nepal’s infrastructure development and human capital formation.

A full access to The Araniko Project provides a nuanced perspective on China’s overall influence in Nepal. Through the lens of history, art, society, politics, and economics, we explore how a global superpower influences Nepal, and how Nepal engages with China. As the only newsletter and institution in Nepal continuously dedicated to advancing the study of China, we are powered by the support of our readers and well-wishers. Therefore, consider going paid: Your subscription not only sustains our ability to produce original contents, but also helps us push forward national conversations on Nepal-China relations.

Join us on the other side of paywall. Readers abroad can click on the link below, while readers in China can contact us via email to pay via WeChat/Alipay and readers in Nepal can click here on becoming a paid subscriber.

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Welcome to The Araniko Project’s Nepal - China in a Month update for May 2025. This post is available for paid users only so consider going paid to receive monthly updates and much more on Nepal - China relations. Your support will help The Araniko Project’s mission in providing important insights on Nepal-China relations and beyond. Readers abroad can click on the paywall link below, while readers in China can contact us via email to pay via WeChat/Alipay and readers in Nepal can click here on becoming a paid subscriber.

Content

Political

Minister of ID-CPC, Liu Jianchao Meets Former Nepali President Bidya Devi Bhandari during CPC Dialogue in Beijing.

Senior Chinese Legislator visits Nepal and attends Sagarmatha Sambaad

Chinese Embassy issues second warning to citizens over Nepal-India Border Crossings

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi meets Nepali Foreign Minister Arzu Rana Deuba in Hong Kong

Economic

Nepal China Economic Summit Held

Yunnan Delegation visits Nepal Overseas Chinese Association to discuss trade and cultural cooperation

China-backed tea project launched to support rural development in Nepal

Longyan Black tea makes first export to Nepal amid record growth

China Nepal SCO demonstrations zone hosts trade and culture promotion in Kathmandu

Jiangxi and Nepal sign strategic agreement to deepen trade and investment cooperation

Social

China and Nepal hosts Think Tank forum to mark 70 years of diplomatic ties

Nepal China Photo Exhibition marks 70 years of diplomatic ties

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Context: When a travel delay led Mochen, a Chinese finance professional, to Nepal, she never imagined it would spark a career transformation. Captivated by Nepal’s vibrant handmade wool felt hats, she quit her corporate job to become a cross-border entrepreneur, linking Nepalese artisans with China’s niche fashion scene. But building a business in Nepal, where “slow living” defines work culture, came with unexpected challenges. This is a summary of an article that follows a Chinese entrepreneur’s journey of cultural negotiation, creative commerce, and personal reinvention in the heart of Nepal’s craft industry.

Become a paid subscriber to read the full content. Readers can click on the paywall link below, while readers in/from China can contact us via email to pay via WeChat/Alipay and readers in Nepal can click here to become a paid subscriber.

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